Thirty years of regret. What was done to Japan over the Northern Territories, the Senkakus and Takeshima, what Japan said, and what Japan did, counted from the government's own records. Japan acted with something other than words in six cases, twice or more in the same case only three times, and every one ended in a release, a deportation or a refusal. Warning shots: zero

The question

While reading the thread in note 0039 I set myself a piece of homework. Japan scrambles its jets and expresses regret: how many times has it done that in 30 years, and did it work? Then I added to it. Not just Russia: when a dispute flared over Takeshima, the Northern Territories or the Senkakus, what happened in those 30 years, how many times was regret expressed, and did Japan ever answer with anything other than words? Did it ever do so twice in the same case?

And my own reading has been the same from the start: Japan is taken for a pushover. I counted in order to find out whether that is something the numbers can say, or whether it stays a reading.

This note counts not a comment thread but the Japanese government's own published records: the Joint Staff's annual scramble report, the Japan Coast Guard's page on Chinese vessels around the Senkakus, Foreign Ministry press releases and the Prime Minister's Office transcripts. Where something could not be counted, I say so. The period is September 1996 to September 2026.

One thing first. South Korea is not a communist state. Takeshima is in these tables because it is the third place where Japan has protested, year after year, over territory.

What could be counted, and what could not

The number of times the word regret was spoken could not be counted. No tally exists in the chief cabinet secretary's briefings, the foreign minister's briefings or the Foreign Ministry's press releases. What can be counted instead is the number of occasions on which the government announced a protest. On the Senkakus the Foreign Ministry writes this: whenever an intrusion into territorial waters occurs, Japan demands the vessels leave at the scene and at the same time lodges an immediate and stern protest with the Chinese government through diplomatic channels, demanding immediate withdrawal and no recurrence. In other words, the number of protests equals the number of intrusions.

The air: 22 in 30 years, warning shots zero

The Defense Ministry has published 49 airspace violations from 1967 to May 2025: Russia including the Soviet Union 44, China 4, Taiwan 1. From September 1996 the list holds 20 (Russia 16, China 4); add the two flights over the Northern Territories announced in July and September 2026 and the 30-year total is 22, of which 18 are Russian.

The response column holds only what I could confirm in ministry announcements, ministers' briefings and press reports of the day. Rows that say only scramble are rows where I could not confirm whether a protest was made. The formula is a single one. Here are the defence minister's words at his emergency press conference on 23 September 2024, as spoken: the violation was extremely regrettable, and Japan had that day lodged an extremely stern protest with the Russian government through diplomatic channels and strongly demanded that it not happen again. The flares that day are the only response in 30 years that went beyond radio and words. Warning shots have been fired once in the history of the Self-Defense Forces, on 9 December 1987 at a Soviet Tu-16 bomber over the main island of Okinawa. In these 30 years, zero.

Scrambles themselves: 15,369 over the 30 fiscal years from 1996 to 2025, rising from 234 in fiscal 1996 to 1,168 in fiscal 2016, and 595 in fiscal 2025.

The Senkakus: intrusions doubled in a decade, and so did the protests

The numbers. In 2012, the year of the purchase, intrusions into territorial waters ran to 20 days and contiguous-zone entries to 91 days. In 2021, the year of China's Coast Guard Law, 40 days and 332 days. Both come from the Coast Guard's own annual report, as cited by the Ocean Policy Research Institute. The Coast Guard's Report 2024 says of 2023 that the annual count reached 352 days in the contiguous zone, a new record. The Coast Guard publishes daily vessel counts but leaves the yearly sums to the reader. Summed from those daily figures: 2023, 352 days and 129 vessels into territorial waters; 2024, 355 days and 115 vessels; 2025, 357 days and 89 vessels; 2026, 245 days and 46 vessels to 6 September. The government's own summary is that intrusions doubled in a decade and the contiguous zone became a daily presence. By its own words, the number of protests equals the number of intrusions.

In this table Japan acted with something other than words four times: the arrest and deportation of 2004, the arrest and extended detention of 2010, the purchase of 2012, and the request to the airlines in 2013. The reasoning in 2013 was that filing a flight plan would amount to recognising China's zone; the three carriers on China routes filed anyway, for the safety of their aircraft. It is a record of an instruction from the government that private companies did not follow. The Coast Guard also built a dedicated Senkaku patrol force of twelve cutters by February 2016 and added new jets by the end of fiscal 2019, which is action beyond words too, but it answers no single case, so it is not in the table. The 2004 case ended in deportation after two days, the 2010 case in release after 16 days. The purchase was Japan's own initiative, and the Chinese ships came every day after it.

Takeshima: drills twice a year, about 60 protests in 30 years

South Korea has occupied Takeshima since 1952. Japan has formally proposed referring the dispute to the International Court of Justice three times, and by the Foreign Ministry's own account those were a note verbale in September 1954, refused by South Korea that October; a proposal at the foreign ministers' meeting of March 1962, which South Korea did not accept; and a note verbale in August 2012, refused the same month.

The same page explains why Japan cannot simply sue. The court begins hearing a dispute only when both parties agree to have it settled there. Japan has, since 1958, accepted the court's compulsory jurisdiction as a rule even where the other party files against it without agreement. South Korea has not taken that position. So even if Japan filed alone, no jurisdiction would arise unless South Korea chose to take part. The country written off as a pushover for not shooting also sits inside a mechanism that will not let it sue. In these 30 years Japan acted with something other than words twice: the survey plan of 2006 and the recall and proposal of 2012. The first ended in cancellation, the second in refusal. The expansion of the currency swap ended in October of that same year, but the Bank of Japan described that as ending on schedule, so I do not count it as a countermeasure.

The Northern Territories: six landings by Russian leaders, six protests

No Russian leader set foot on the Northern Territories before 2010. Since then, six times in 16 years. Japan's response was a protest all six times, and the only step beyond words was the temporary recall of the ambassador in 2010. The breaking-off of talks in March 2022 was Russia's answer to Japan's sanctions over the invasion of Ukraine, so the order there runs the other way: Japan acted (sanctions), Russia answered (talks ended), Japan protested.

Six cases of action beyond words; three with two or more actions

From the 30-year tables, here is everything Japan did that was neither radio nor words.

Japan acted twice or more in the same case three times: the Senkakus in 2004, the Senkakus in 2010, Takeshima in 2012. All three ended in a deportation, a release or a refusal. The 2012 purchase of the three Senkaku islands was Japan's own initiative, so it is not in this table. The 2022 sanctions on Russia answered the invasion of Ukraine, not a territorial dispute.

And weapons. A Self-Defense Force fighter used a weapon once, in 1987. I found no case in the published records of these 30 years in which the coast guard used a weapon at the Senkakus. Aircraft shot down: zero. Warning shots: zero.

Did it work?

What the numbers allow.

• The air. Announced Russian violations: five in 2001 to 2010, seven in 2011 to 2020, six in 2021 to 2026. No decline. After the flares of September 2024, two flights over the Northern Territories were announced in 2026.
• The sea. Intrusions around the Senkakus doubled from 20 days in 2012 to 40 in 2021, and contiguous-zone presence went from 91 days to 357, almost every day. Protests were lodged as many times as the intrusions.
• The islands. Landings by Russian leaders: none before 2010, six since. South Korea's drills continue twice a year, and in 2021 its national police chief landed.

One case in the records shows a protest achieving what it asked. The buoy placed in July 2023 was removed by China in February 2025. It took one year and seven months, but it is the one instance where what Japan demanded came about. The six cases in which Japan acted beyond words, by contrast, all ended with Japan stepping back or the other side refusing.

I do not write that none of it worked. The argument that not protesting would be read as acquiescence appeared twice in the 0039 thread too. What I can write is that the record shows 30 years of the same words, no decline in the behaviour they answered, and a Japan that stepped back each time it went beyond them.

I said Japan is taken for a pushover. The records do not prove it. Whether the other side holds Japan in contempt sits inside their heads, and neither the Defense Ministry nor the Foreign Ministry writes it down. The records show two things only. In 30 years the behaviour has not declined. And all six cases in which Japan went beyond words ended with Japan stepping back or the other side refusing. Past that point it is not a number. It is my reading.

For readers outside Japan: why Japan does not fire, and the three islands

Why it does not fire. What the Self-Defense Forces may do against an aircraft violating Japanese airspace is written in Article 84 of the Self-Defense Forces Act: the measures necessary to make it land or leave the airspace over Japanese territory. The government's reading is that weapons may be used only in self-defence or to avert imminent danger. Unless the intruder fires, Japan does not. The coast guard works under the same pattern, with Article 20 of the Japan Coast Guard Act setting the conditions for the use of weapons. So Japan's response stops at radio, manoeuvre, flares and a protest through diplomatic channels. When 7.7 percent of the 0039 thread wrote shoot it down, this is the country whose thread it was.

Regret. Ikan, regret, is the diplomatic word for "we deplore this". In almost every case the Japanese government says extremely regrettable, and follows with a stern protest through diplomatic channels and a strong demand that it not happen again. The Japanese internet mocks this as the regret cannon, ikan-hō.

The Northern Territories. Four islands east of Hokkaido, occupied by the Soviet Union in 1945 and administered by Russia. Japan claims them; so does Russia. The Senkaku islands. Uninhabited islands west of Okinawa, administered by Japan and claimed by China and Taiwan. Since the Japanese government bought three of them from their private owner in 2012, Chinese coast guard ships have come to the waters around them almost every day. Takeshima. Small islets off Shimane prefecture, occupied by South Korea since 1952 and garrisoned by its police. Japan claims them and has three times proposed settling the matter at the International Court of Justice; South Korea has refused three times.

On all three islands Japan uses the same words. The number I wanted to count was how many times those words were spoken. That could not be counted. What could be counted is that the occasions for saying them have not declined in 30 years.